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Interactions Between Food Attributes in Markets: 
The Case of Environmental Labeling 
 
Introduction 
Some consumers derive utility from buying and using food products produced under 
specific processes, such as environmentally friendly practices. Means of verifying the use of 
these practices are frequently necessary in order for markets to function efficiently and without 
fraud because the consumer cannot evaluate whether particular practices were used. Analysis of 
eco-labeling has focused to a large extent on the operation of markets for environmental 
attributes without adequately addressing the total food product. Our analysis differs by treating 
eco-friendliness as a component of a product’s overall quality rather than as a stand-alone 
attribute. We explore the extent to which the importance and credibility of environmental claims 
interact with a product’s other quality attributes in determining the likelihood of success in 
marketing eco-friendly food products. 
If consumers perceive a correlation between a process attribute, such as eco-friendliness, 
and other product attributes that they can evaluate, the quality levels of such supporting attributes 
can be a substitute for or complement to direct verification of environmental attributes. Thus 
verifiable attributes that can be inspected for before purchase or evaluated after use can support 
the credibility of the process claim, without strictly proving its truthfulness. Similarly, the 
credibility of an eco-friendly claim can be damaged by a failure to provide adequate levels of 
other verifiable attributes. Our results suggest that the market success of environmentally 
friendly food products requires a mix of environmental and other verifiable attributes that 
together signal credibility. 
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An Overview of Quality Perception and Assurance 
Understanding of the operation of markets for food, and food attributes, has evolved 
greatly based on analysis of the information environment available to consumers. Consumers’ 
perception of quality is influenced by the product’s intrinsic attributes as well as by extrinsic 
indicators and cues provided by the seller of the product. Intrinsic attributes relate to a broad 
array of attributes including food safety, nutrition, convenience, composition, and process 
attributes such as eco-friendliness (Caswell, Noelke, and Mojduszka). The information 
environment for different intrinsic attributes may be search, experience, or credence in nature 
(Akerlof; Nelson; Darby and Karni): the consumer can learn about the quality level prior to 
purchase (search), after purchase and use (experience), or not at all (credence). Extrinsic 
indicators (e.g., certification, labeling) and cues (e.g., brand name, packaging, price) convey 
search information to the consumer since they are available prior to purchase (Steenkamp). The 
consumer’s perception of quality is formed from a blend of information from these multiple 
sources. 
An attribute can switch between the categories of search, experience, and credence based 
on transaction conditions, including the use of extrinsic indicators and cues, the technology of 
testing and labeling, and the benefits and costs of information acquisition for buyers (Caswell 
and Mojduszka). Figure 1 presents examples of such transformations. For example, mandatory 
labeling can change an a priori credence characteristic such as use of genetically modified 
organisms (GMOs) into a search characteristic. Opaque packaging changes a search attribute 
such as color into an experience attribute. The transformation of an attribute is sometimes the 
result of changes in the food distribution system. For example, long, global supply chains may 
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make origin and production practices less transparent to consumers in the absence of traceability 
and labeling. 
The analysis of whether the market will deliver products with different quality levels, 
particularly higher quality, has also been anchored in the context of the information environment 
(see, e.g., Stigler; Akerlof; Lancaster). Problems of adverse selection and moral hazard can occur 
where important product attributes are experience or credence in nature. Adverse selection is ex 
ante opportunism due to hidden information. It could occur, for example, where some producers 
provide false labeling about environmental attributes and underlying production practices 
causing consumers to choose products that do not in fact have the attributes they want. Moral 
hazard is an ex post opportunism due to hidden action. In quality assurance, a moral hazard 
situation arises when the producer is tempted to not carry out all the practices necessary to 
achieve a certain quality level because the consumer cannot or finds it difficult to check whether 
the actions have been taken. 
In cases of both adverse selection and moral hazard, the market will not fully reward high 
quality producers or adequately punish low quality producers. While moral hazard is a real issue 
in environmental certification, it may be mitigated to some extent by the need for producers to 
make significant initial investments in knowledge, skills, materials, and time to become certified. 
Indeed, acquiring and assimilating environmental abilities implies initial sunk costs and can be 
considered as a choice made once and for all (see Rogerson for a similar hypothesis). Once 
acquired these abilities can generate a kind of “self lock-in,” partly due to a win-win-win 
strategy, i.e. wins for the firm, the consumer, and the environment. We focus here on the 
consumer end of the market where adverse selection, of the type first analyzed by Akerlof, 
remains a significant problem. 
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Several mechanisms, such as reputation, efficient quality signaling, advertising, and 
government standards can mitigate adverse selection generated by experience goods. (Nelson; 
Klein and Leffler; Bagwell and Riordan; Kirmani and Rao). Credence attributes, such as 
environmental friendliness, pose more problems in markets because the cost of defining, 
measuring, and verifying them can be high, along with the temptation to cheat. A potential 
remedy to the measurement problem is to use a proxy or a signal. Efficient measurement will be 
undertaken by that party to exchange that has easy access to information and lower costs of 
measurement, provided that incentives to cheat are curbed and trust is established (Eggertsson; 
Barzel). For example, because safety output may be too costly to measure (e.g., the absence of 
pesticide residues), it may be more cost effective to measure management practices (e.g., organic 
farming) instead of the final product characteristics. At the end of the food chain, consumers can 
search for the organic label, which is a signal for the proxy, and thereby avoid excessive 
transaction costs in finding and evaluating products. Of course, the proxy and signal may convey 
information about multiple attributes. 
Insuring the credible operation of markets for credence attributes may require external 
intervention to allow consumers to choose products that correspond to their preferences and 
honest producers to credibly signal their products. Macho-Stadtler and Perez-Castrillo suggest 
sufficient conditions for a market for credence attributes to function effectively (i.e., for a 
separating equilibrium to exist), allowing eco-friendly producers to label their products at a non-
prohibitive cost. These conditions are: 1) eco-friendly producers can acquire the eco-seal at a 
lower cost than conventional producers, 2) the expected profit with an eco-seal minus the cost of 
acquiring the signal is greater than the profit without the eco-seal for eco-friendly producers, and 
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3) the expected profit with an eco-seal minus the cost of acquiring the signal is less than the 
profit without the eco-seal for conventional producers. 
If successful in designing and supporting the costs of signaling through a labeling 
program, eco-friendly producers transform a credence attribute into a search attribute where 
consumers can make successful selections based on reliable information. In other cases, 
governmental intervention or credible third party intervention may be needed to mitigate market 
failure and guarantee fair-trading (McCluskey).  
Even though information about credence characteristics may be disclosed, consumers 
may have difficulty in processing it because of time constraints or a lack of specific skills. Eco-
label design matters because of these information problems. For example, Wynne shows that 
environmental report cards (graphical presentation of environmental performance without value 
judgments) establish symmetrical but useless information for consumers who lack expertise and 
time to process them. Well-designed eco-labels can serve as cognitive supports that economize 
on the attention of consumers and on transaction costs (Valceschini; Wynne). 
Overall, in many cases market mechanisms can be self-enforcing for both search and 
experience attributes, while credence attributes may require an increased level of external 
intervention in order for markets for quality to function effectively. Here we focus on the 
implications for the marketing of eco-friendly products of consumer perception of interactions 
between the search, experience, and credence attributes of food products. 
 
A Basic Model of Interaction Between Product Attributes in Determining  
the Likelihood of Eco-Friendly Production 
 
Consider the case of a consumer willing to promote environmentally friendly practices in 
farming and processing by buying credibly eco-labeled food products (for a similar model, see 
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van Ravenswaay and Blend). The consumer’s utility from consuming an eco-labeled product is 
determined by both credence environmental characteristics and the product’s related search and 
experience characteristics. To model the choice between two products assume that the typical 
consumer derives utility from: 1) consuming two goods, a conventionally produced product X 
that does not carry eco-labeling at a price P and a product with enhanced environmental features 
X’ that is eco-labeled at a price P’, and 2) consuming the quality of the environment Q. 
Several factors play a role in the consumer’s utility: 
• The utility resulting from the consumption of the experience and search attributes of 
X or X’, i.e. δU/δX versus δU/δX’. Most generally, (δU/δX’ - δU/δX) could be 
positive, zero, or negative. 
• The environmental improvement resulting from X or X’, i.e., δQ/δX versus δQ/δX’. 
• The utility resulting from the environmental improvement, i.e., δU/δQ. 
Assume that utility increases with consuming the products X (δU/δX>0) or X’ (δU/δX’>0), and 
enjoying the environment (δU/δQ>0). As noted above, the eco-labeled product could have 
related search and experience characteristics that are better or worse than the conventional 
product. X and X’ are both harmful to the environment (δQ/δX<0 and δQ/δX’<0) but the eco-
labeled product X’ is less harmful than the conventional one X. The quality of the environment 
Q is decreasing with X and X’ but more slowly with X’ than with X so that δQ/δX ≤ δQ/δX’ ≤ 0. 
The environmental improvement with X’ is δQ/δX’ - δQ/δX. Because of differences in related 
search and experience characteristics, the expected utility from consuming an eco-labeled 
product could be higher than (δU/δX’>δU/δX), the same as (δU/δX’=δU/δX), or less than 
(δU/δX’<δU/δX) the expected utility from consuming a conventional product. 
Under these assumptions, the consumer problem is to: 
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(1) Max U(X, X’, Q(X, X’)) under the constraint: PX + P’X’ = I 
where U is a quasi-concave utility function and I is consumer income spent on goods X and X’. 
The Lagrangian function is: 
(2) F(X, X’, Q, λ) = U(X, X’, Q(X, X’)) + (I-P·X-P’·X’)λ 
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier. The partial derivatives are: 
(3) FX = δU/δX + δU/δQ·δQ/δX - λ·P = 0 
(4) FX’ = δU/δX’ + δU/δQ·δQ/δX’ - λ·P’ = 0 
(5) Fλ = I-P·X-P’·X’ = 0 
By rearranging the previous equations: 
(6) FX’ - FX  = δU/δX’ - δU/δX + δU/δQ·(δQ/δX’ - δQ/δX) - λ·(P’-P) = 0 
If (δU/δX’)-(δU/δX)>0 and δU/δQ·(δQ/δX’ - δQ/δX)>0, P’>P as consumers are willing to pay a 
price premium α for an eco-labeled good: 
(7) α = P’ - P = [(δU/δX’ - δU/δX) + δU/δQ·(δQ/δX’ - δQ/δX)]/λ 
with 
(8) λ = [δU/δX + (δU/δQ·δQ/δX)]/P = [δU/δX’ + (δU/δQ·δQ/δX’)]/P’ 
Assume that taking into account the environmental impacts of the production process 
increases production costs so that the marginal production cost of X’, i.e., Cm(X’) is greater than 
the marginal production cost of X, i.e., Cm(X), or in other words Cm(X’) > Cm(X). Therefore, 
producers adopt the eco-friendly process if the difference between the marginal costs of the two 
products is less than α, i.e., the marginal value of the utility resulting from the environmental 
improvement of the last unit (δU/δQ·(δQ/δX’ - δQ/δX)) plus the marginal utility resulting from 
the increase of related search and experience attributes of the last unit (δU/δX’ - δU/δX). 
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If Cm(X’) - Cm (X) > α , the price of the eco-labeled product would be too high and the 
consumer would only consume the conventional product X. If Cm(X’) - Cm (X) < α, then the 
price fixed by the eco-friendly producer would be low enough that the eco-friendly producer 
captures the whole demand and there is no demand for X. Lastly, if Cm(X’) - Cm (X) = α, the 
consumer will be indifferent between consuming the two goods. Consequently, producing an 
eco-labeled good and bearing the subsequent extra costs depends on the value of α, which is 
shaped by consumer preferences. The smaller α is the smaller the cost difference between the 
eco-labeled and conventional product must be for viability, which reduces the potential for 
producing an eco-labeled good. Similarly, the larger α is, the more likelihood there is that the 
eco-labeled product can be viably produced. 
Several cases related to the interaction of different types of attributes are shown in Table 
1. First, consider the situation where (δU/δX’ - δU/δX) is zero, i.e. the level of related search and 
experience attributes of the two products is equivalent (Row B). This is the only case analysed in 
most discussions of eco-labeling because attribute interactions are ignored. Here the exclusive 
focus is on the effect of eco-characteristics (δU/δQ·(δQ/δX’ - δQ/δX)). There are four cases: 
• Cell B1. Producing the eco-labeled item generates a high environmental improvement, 
and consumers highly value it. The overall impact on α is significant and producers will 
be likely to produce the eco-labeled product. 
• Cell B2. Producing the eco-labeled item has a low impact on environmental quality but 
consumers value this small impact highly. The overall impact on α is significant and 
producers may be likely to produce the eco-labeled product despite the fact that the 
overall environmental improvement as a result is modest. 
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• Cell B3. The environmental improvement resulting from producing the eco-labeled 
product is high but consumers place a low value on this change in environmental quality. 
The overall impact on α is weak. Producing an eco-labeled product can improve 
environmental quality significantly but the producer is not willing to do so under these 
market conditions. 
• Cell B4. Producing the eco-labeled item generates a small environmental improvement 
and consumers do not value the improvement. The overall impact on α is insignificant 
and producers will be unlikely to produce he eco-labeled products. 
Second is the case where (δU/δX’ - δU/δX) is positive, i.e. the level of related search and 
experience attributes of the eco-friendly product is significantly higher than that of the 
conventional product. In all four cases (Cells A1, A2, A3, and A4), the higher level of related 
search and experience attributes for the eco-friendly product has a positive impact on the 
likelihood of production of eco-labeled products compared to the base case of no difference in 
these attributes for all combinations of environmental impact and consumer valuation of that 
impact. 
Of particular interest is Cell A4. If both the effect of the environmental improvement 
(δQ/δX’ - δQ/δX) and the valuation of the improvement (δU/δQ) is low or close to zero, the eco-
friendly product may still be produced if the search and experience attributes are significantly 
better than for the conventional product. This case can be interpreted more as an investment of 
the producer in the signal (i.e., the label) rather than in the achievement of eco-characteristics. 
Third is the case where (δU/δX’ - δU/δX) is negative, i.e. the level of related search and 
experience attributes of the eco-friendly product is significantly lower than that of the 
conventional product. In all the corresponding cases (Cells C1, C2, C3, and C4), the lower level 
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of related search and experience attributes of the eco-friendly product has a negative impact on 
the likelihood that the eco-friendly product will be produced compared to the base case of no 
difference in search and experience attributes. 
An indeterminate case is Cell C1 where there are two opposite effects. On one hand, the 
combined effect of a high environmental improvement (δQ/δX’ - δQ/δX) and the high valuation 
of the improvement (δU/δQ) is likely to encourage the production of eco-friendly product. On 
the other hand, the lower level of related search and experience characteristics is likely to 
discourage such production. The stronger effect determines whether the producer produces the 
eco-friendly product. 
The cases presented in Table 1 are scenarios for looking at the impact of different levels 
of related search and experience attributes on the likelihood of production of eco-friendly 
products when this production has different environmental effects and these effects are valued at 
varying levels by consumers. Where the search and experience attributes of eco-friendly 
products are superior to those of conventional products, eco-friendly production and marketing 
will be more likely. 
 
When Search and Experience Attributes Are Used  
as Indicators of Credence Attributes 
 
The interaction effect between search, experience, and credence attributes on the 
likelihood of eco-friendly production and marketing may be intensified where consumers use 
search and experience attributes as indicators of credence attributes. Products are bundles of 
attributes and in real markets information on some of these attributes may serve as indicators of 
the quality of others. Similarly extrinsic indicators (e.g., certification, labeling) and cues (e.g., 
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brand name, packaging, price) can be used to provide signals about the level of intrinsic quality 
attributes. 
To market their products more effectively and to avoid high measurement and signaling 
costs, producers may use the level of and information on search and experience attributes, which 
consumers can verify, to reinforce signaling about the quality level of credence attributes. For 
their part, consumers must use an array of information to give credence to claims about process 
quality. These include labels that represent testing efforts by parties in the supply chain as well 
as inspection and verification of the other quality attributes of the product. For example, 
consumers are generally unable to measure intrinsic process attributes such as the impact of 
production practices on the environment but may make inferences about these attributes from 
extrinsic quality indicators and cues such as eco-seals of approval or brand names. 
In a multi-attribute/multi-signal atmosphere, attributes and certification systems interact 
and can reinforce or attenuate each other’s effects. The precise dividing lines between types of 
certification may be fuzzy at the consumer level, particularly for credence attributes. For 
example, fair trade certification can reinforce the credibility of an environmental certification. 
Many fair trade labels, such as Max Havelaar, include environmental requirements and vice 
versa because final consumers in developed countries are sensitive to a range of issues regarding 
methods and conditions of production (Zadek, Lingayah, and Fortater). From another 
perspective, the co-existence of several certification systems tends to increase the consumers’ 
transaction costs in acquiring and processing information making it more difficult to capture 
their attention. As a result there has been some evolution away from one-dimensional to multi-
dimensional certification systems, such as integrated quality-environment-safety systems. Such 
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systems facilitate simplified signals to consumers that synthesize several attributes, allowing for 
lower transaction costs. 
We focus on how the quality levels of search and experience attributes and information 
on them influence the consumer’s evaluation of the credibility of an eco-seal, which signals the 
credence attribute of environmental friendliness. Figure 2 presents a simplified sequence for this 
interaction: 
• Producers signal the credence attribute of environmental friendliness through use of an 
eco-seal of approval. The level of this credence attribute is a promise made by producers 
that is unverifiable by consumers. 
• Consumers form expectations on the levels of related search (e.g., less packaging) and 
experience (e.g., better taste) attributes, which will be associated with the eco-seal. 
Consumers may also form expectations about extrinsic indicators (e.g., other types of 
certification) and cues (e.g., more expensive price, higher quality brand name). 
• Consumers assess whether their expectations about the product’s search and experience 
attributes are met by inspecting the product and/or buying and using it. 
• Consumers are either satisfied with or disappointed in the degree to which the quality of 
the search and experience attributes corresponds to their expectations. 
• If satisfied, consumers will give more credence to the truthfulness of the producers’ 
signal regarding the credence attribute of environmental friendliness (positive feedback). 
If disappointed, consumers will give less credence to the truthfulness of the producers’ 
signal regarding environmental quality (negative feedback). 
The key links in the above sequence are the feedback loops that connect expectations and 
eventual product evaluation across quality attributes. These expectations may not be 
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scientifically proven and objective; they frequently correspond to subjective beliefs. They are 
well documented in several empirical studies. For example, Søndergaard surveyed consumers of 
ecological (i.e., organic) fish in Spain, Germany, and Denmark. She found that among the most 
important reasons for purchasing ecological food were that these products were believed to be of 
higher quality, tastier, and healthier than conventional food products. Similarly, CEC found that 
the interest of Canadian, Mexican, and American consumers in shade grown coffee was most 
influenced by the perception that this type of coffee is superior in taste and quality. In addition, 
the French Federal Consumers Union (Union Fédérale des Consommateurs) argues that 
consumers “often perceive environmentally friendly practices in farming and breeding like an 
indicator of the food safety and taste of the final product.” 
In many purchase situations, consumers face product attribute information that is too 
costly to evaluate directly and objectively, leading to use of heuristics to simplify decision-
making. The interaction of information on the different types of attributes will influence the 
subsequent purchasing decisions of consumers. Note that the credibility of the claim about the 
credence attribute is reinforced or undermined without the consumer directly assessing its 
veracity. While these related search and experience attributes might be imperfect (or perhaps 
very imperfect) indicators of the credibility of the credence signal, consumers will use them to 
form their overall quality perceptions. They may use these related characteristics as a screening 
device to judge the reliability of the seller’s credence claims. 
This situation can be further developed from the basic model presented in the previous 
section. The consumer values eco-characteristics but cannot assess their presence and infers 
whether the expected and promised eco-characteristics are present based on observable related 
search and experience characteristics. In this case, Row C of Table 1 in not relevant because 
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producers have no incentive to produce eco-friendly products where the low level of search and 
experience attributes relative to conventional products undermines the credibility of the credence 
eco-friendly claim. The positive interaction effect will be strongest where the related search and 
credence attributes of the eco-friendly product are superior to those of the conventional product 
(Row A of Table 1). 
Suppose that consumers have the same beliefs and give a certain credence to an eco-
friendly claim if the difference in the search and experience attributes between the eco-friendly 
and conventional products is greater than an exogenous given level, U*, i.e., (δU/δX’ - δU/δX) ≥ 
U*. The likelihood of buying an eco-friendly product, Pe, can be expressed as: 
(9) Pe = p·f(δU/δX’ - δU/δX) 
where f(δU/δX’ - δU/δX) = 1 if (δU/δX’ - δU/δX) ≥U* and f(δU/δX’ - δU/δX) = 0 if (δU/δX’ - 
δU/δX) < U*. The probability p describes the level of trust the consumer has in the relationship 
between the level of the search and experience attributes and the credibility of the eco-friendly 
claim, where p Є [0;1]. This probability can also be interpreted in the case of informed parties, 
such as public authorities or environmental activists, as the degree of scientific certainty about 
the relationship between the achievement of a particular level of related attributes and the 
achievement of the eco-friendly promise. 
Table 2 shows the polar cases. For example, if consumers wholly trust the relationship 
(p=1) and the eco-friendly product’s search and experience attributes are high enough ((δU/δX’ - 
δU/δX) ≥U*), then they will trust the claim and buy the eco-friendly product because they infer 
the achievement of eco-characteristics from the observable related characteristics. In the other 
three cases shown in Table 2, the likelihood of purchasing an eco-friendly product is zero 
because there is no trust in the relationship between search and experience attributes and the 
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environmental claim, even though the levels of these attributes are high enough, or the levels of 
the search and experience attributes are not high enough to lend credence to the eco-friendly 
claim regardless of the level of trust consumers place in the link between verifiable and credence 
attributes. 
In addition to the relationships between search, experience, and credence attributes 
shown in Table 2, consumers can make more complex connections between intrinsic attributes 
and extrinsic cues and indicators. Especially when consumers make repeated purchases over 
time, they can use inferences across attributes, cues, and indicators to evaluate attributes that 
they cannot verify. Doing so reduces the consumer’s information and transaction costs by 
serving as a substitute for an expensive process of gathering and processing complex information 
or acquiring costly information from disinterested third parties. A common inference by 
consumers regards the extrinsic cue of price. For example, many consumers distrust 
environmental claims on low priced products because they perceive a dissonance between a low 
price and an environmental promise. 
 
Implications for Marketing Eco-Labeled Products 
Our analysis suggests that there is a credibility area for eco-friendly food products. This 
area depends on how the different attributes of a product are differentiated in a particular country 
or among particular market segments. The level of a product’s environmental soundness or 
environmental stewardship may be vertically differentiated, that is at the same price and with 
identical other attributes all consumers would prefer the more environmentally sound product, 
although the degree to which this is the case may be weak among some consumers. Other 
attributes may be differentiated vertically or horizontally (i.e., at the same price and with 
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identical other attributes some consumers would prefer one quality level while others would 
prefer other levels).  
Our conceptual definition of an eco-friendly product corresponds to a conventionally 
produced product with additional environmental attributes. As discussed above, the 
environmental attribute can interact with several other dimensions of product quality. These 
interactions can be objective or perceived. Eco-labels themselves correspond to different bundles 
of environmental criteria, selected according to the judgment of governments, certifiers, or 
producers, which can diverge from the individual preferences of market participants. As 
observers have noted, greenness is a confusingly multidimensional concept. Indeed 
environmental friendliness may frequently not be the dominant driver in consumers’ product 
choices but instead be an additional and secondary consideration. In this case, environmentally 
friendly products may be horizontally differentiated. 
Figure 3 shows a simplified two-dimensional attribute space for food products. The 
vertical axis indicates the level of environmental characteristics, while the horizontal axis 
indicates the level of search and experience attributes. In the characteristic space at time t, to be 
certified to a particular standard eco-friendly food products must have environmental 
characteristics with a minimum level Ae. At the same time, to be credible eco-friendly food 
products may have to have quality levels for search and experience attributes at least as high as 
Ac, the level of these attributes necessary to lend credence to the eco-friendly claim. The 
credibility area for eco-friendly food products is the shaded space where (x, y) Є (Ac, Ae). From 
a conceptual point of view, all the products in this area could be successfully labeled and 
marketed as eco-friendly. At (t+1), the Ac and Ae thresholds could move to correspond to new 
consumer requirements. 
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The market success of eco-friendly food products is closely linked to the shape and 
location of this credibility area and to the products’ position within it, taking into account not 
only environmental attributes but also related search and experience attributes. In a context 
where consumers have limited processing time and abilities, the credibility of environmental 
labeling is linked to the transaction environment. Consumer perceptions of these parameters can 
work together to mitigate or reinforce informational asymmetry and overload. 
A high level of search and experience attributes detectable by consumers before or after 
the purchase can support the credibility of environmental claims by mitigating two distinct 
sources of market failure. First, these high levels will support the credibility of the credence 
claims regarding environmental attributes. Second, an expectation of high search and experience 
quality can attenuate the potential for free riding (i.e., fraud) linked to provision of most 
environmental attributes. Most environmental attributes are public goods and associating private 
with public benefits can mitigate free riding. 
Consumers’ inferences have important managerial implications for producers, marketers, 
and policymakers. To be successful, producers and marketers cannot rely only on third party 
certification to ensure the credibility of their claims but have to invest in the production of 
related search and experience attributes, even if consumer inferences based on them are 
subjective. The design of effective eco-labels has to include a clear understanding of how 
consumers make inferences about the credibility of an environmental claim. 
An example is the Conservation Grade label developed in response to consumer demand 
for less intensively produced food that is marketed in several European countries, including the 
United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and France. It promises consumers minimal use of 
agricultural chemicals and pharmaceuticals, optimum animal welfare in food production, and 
 18
that the farmer cares for wildlife environments. Certification standards are less strict than for 
organic foods. The standards are defined by a union of producers and monitored by independent 
inspectors. In France, all Jordans (www.jordans.fr) breakfast cereals carry the Conservation 
Grade symbol. The label text (translated from the French) explains that the Conservation Grade 
is “both a label and a standard, defined in England where there are a lot of environmental 
protectors. It ensures that all products produced on farms respecting these specifications are 
farmed without chemical inputs leaving traces either in the soil or in the harvest. It means a 
double guarantee: an authentic taste and a better respect of the environment.” The message 
conveyed by the label clearly links environmental protection and taste, encouraging the 
consumers to support the environmental credence claim by tasting the products. 
Consumers’ inferences about relationships between attribute levels may lead producers to 
over invest in search and experience attributes as signal and/or screening devices rather than in 
the production of high credence quality itself. In the extreme case, consumers may believe that 
the production of attractive search and experience related attributes implies the achievement of 
high quality in credence properties as well. This process can transform an a priori credence 
attribute into a search or experience characteristic (Figure 1). Such switching can be initiated by 
consumers’ beliefs and activated by marketing. Taking heuristic procedures used by consumers 
into account may reduce transaction costs and prevent the waste of resources on expensive 
monitoring. On the other hand, producers may attempt to manipulate consumers’ subjective 
inferences raising several questions about the accuracy and regulation of such hybrid claims. 
Our central point is that the credibility of eco-labels among consumers is influenced by 
the accompanying search and experience attributes of the labeled product. Consumers form 
expectations about the levels of search and experience attributes based on the presence of an eco-
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label. Their subsequent evaluation of these attributes then influences the credibility of the 
environmental claim and their interest in repeat purchase of the product based on its 
environmental soundness. Honest environmental differentiation can fail if it does not consider 
the multi-dimensional character of quality perception. An important further step is to identify 
which attributes are most likely to reinforce the credibility of environmental claims among 
different market segments. While private and public authorities define and enforce standards for 
eco-labeling, only products with the right array of accompanying quality attributes are likely to 
be fully credible and successful in the market. 
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TABLE 1. Likelihood of Eco-Friendly Production for Different Levels of Search, Experience, and Environmental Attributes 
 
 
  1 2 3 4 
   (δQ/δX’ - δQ/δX) high, 
(δU/δQ) high 
(δQ/δX’ - δQ/δX) low, 
(δU/δQ) high 
(δQ/δX’ - δQ/δX) high, 
(δU/δQ) low 
(δQ/δX’ - δQ/δX) low, 
(δU/δQ) low 
A  (δU/δX’ - δU/δX)>0 Likely to produce (+++) Likely to produce (++) Likely to produce (+) Indeterminate (+/-) 
B  (δU/δX’ - δU/δX)=0 Likely to produce (++) Likely to produce (+) Unlikely to produce (-) Unlikely to produce (--) 
C  (δU/δX’ - δU/δX)<0 Indeterminate  (+/-) Unlikely to produce (--) Unlikely to produce (--) Unlikely to produce (---) 
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TABLE 2. Likelihood of Buying an Eco-Friendly Product Based on Levels of Related Attributes and Consumer Trust in the 
Relationship to the Eco-Friendly Claim 
 
 
 (δU/δX’ - δU/δX) ≥U* 
so f=1 
(δU/δX’ - δU/δX) < U* 
so f=0 
p = 0 (no trust in the relationship) Pe =0 Pe =0 
p = 1 (complete trust in the relationship) Pe =1 Pe =0 
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FIGURE 1. Examples of Switching of Attributes Between Search, Experience, and Credence 
Categories 
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FIGURE 2. Impact of Search and Experience Attributes on the Credibility of Signaling for 
Credence Attributes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) Producers signal credence
attributes  (e.g. eco-seals of
approval)
(2) Consumers form expectations for
   related search (e.g., color) and  
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FIGURE 3. Credibility Area for Eco-Friendly Products in the Attribute Space 
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